SARS-CoV-2 lineage assignments using phylogenetic placement/UShER are superior to pangoLEARN machine learning method (preprint)

With the rapid spread and evolution of SARS-CoV-2, the ability to monitor its transmission and distinguish among viral lineages is critical for pandemic response efforts. The most commonly used software for the lineage assignment of newly isolated SARS-CoV-2 genomes is pangolin, which offers two methods of assignment, pangoLEARN and pUShER. PangoLEARN rapidly assigns lineages using a machine learning algorithm, while pUShER performs a phylogenetic placement to identify the lineage corresponding to a newly sequenced genome. In a preliminary study, we observed that pangoLEARN (decision tree model), while substantially faster than pUShER, offered less consistency across different versions of pangolin v3. Here, we expand upon this analysis to include v3 and v4 of pangolin, which moved the default algorithm for lineage assignment from pangoLEARN in v3 to pUShER in v4, and perform a thorough analysis confirming that pUShER is not only more stable across versions but also more accurate. Our findings suggest that future lineage assignment algorithms for various pathogens should consider the value of phylogenetic placement.

Transmission modes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 and implications for infection control: a review.

The complete picture regarding transmission modes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is unknown. This review summarises the available evidence on its transmission modes, our preliminary research findings and implications for infection control policy, and outlines future research directions. Environmental contamination has been reported in hospital settings occupied by infected patients, and is higher in the first week of illness. Transmission via environmental surfaces or fomites is likely, but decontamination protocols are effective in minimising this risk. The extent of airborne transmission is also unclear. While several studies have detected SARS-CoV-2 ribonucleic acid in air samples, none has isolated viable virus in culture. Transmission likely lies on a spectrum between droplet and airborne transmission, depending on the patient, disease and environmental factors. Singapore's current personal protective equipment and isolation protocols are sufficient to manage this risk.

Introduction and Establishment of SARS-CoV-2 Gamma Variant in New York City in Early 2021 (preprint)

Background. Monitoring the emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants is an important public health objective. Travel restrictions, aimed to prevent viral spread, have major economic consequences and unclear effectiveness despite considerable research. We investigated the introduction and establishment of the Gamma variant in New York City (NYC) in 2021. Methods. We performed phylogeographic analysis on 15,967 Gamma sequences available on GISAID and sampled between March 10th through May 1st, 2021, to identify geographic sources of Gamma lineages introduced into NYC. We identified locally circulating Gamma transmission clusters and inferred the timing of their establishment in NYC. Findings. We identified 16 phylogenetically-distinct Gamma clusters established in NYC (cluster sizes ranged 2-108 genomes). Most of the NYC clusters were introduced from Florida and Illinois; only one was introduced from outside the United States (US). By the time the first Gamma case was reported by genomic surveillance in NYC on March 10th, the majority (57%) of circulating Gamma lineages had already been established in the city for at least two weeks. Interpretation. Despite the expansion of SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance in NYC, there was a substantial gap between Gamma variant introduction and establishment in January/February 2021, and its identification by genomic surveillance in March 2021. Although travel from Brazil to the US was restricted from May 2020 through the end of the study period, this restriction did not prevent Gamma from becoming established in NYC as most introductions occurred from domestic locations.

Lack of viable severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among PCR-positive air samples from hospital rooms and community isolation facilities.

BACKGROUND: Understanding the extent of aerosol-based transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is important for tailoring interventions for control of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Multiple studies have reported the detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in air samples, but only one study has successfully recovered viable virus, although it is limited by its small sample size. OBJECTIVE: We aimed to determine the extent of shedding of viable SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory aerosols from COVID-19 patients. METHODS: In this observational air sampling study, air samples from airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) and a community isolation facility (CIF) housing COVID-19 patients were collected using a water vapor condensation method into liquid collection media. Samples were tested for presence of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid using quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR), and qRT-PCR-positive samples were tested for viability using viral culture. RESULTS: Samples from 6 (50%) of the 12 sampling cycles in hospital rooms were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, including aerosols ranging from <1 µm to >4 µm in diameter. Of 9 samples from the CIF, 1 was positive via qRT-PCR. Viral RNA concentrations ranged from 179 to 2,738 ORF1ab gene copies per cubic meter of air. Virus cultures were negative after 4 blind passages. CONCLUSION: Although SARS-CoV-2 is readily captured in aerosols, virus culture remains challenging despite optimized sampling methodologies to preserve virus viability. Further studies on aerosol-based transmission and control of SARS-CoV-2 are needed.

Environmental contamination in a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) intensive care unit-What is the risk?

BACKGROUND: The risk of environmental contamination by severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the intensive care unit (ICU) is unclear. We evaluated the extent of environmental contamination in the ICU and correlated this with patient and disease factors, including the impact of different ventilatory modalities. METHODS: In this observational study, surface environmental samples collected from ICU patient rooms and common areas were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Select samples from the common area were tested by cell culture. Clinical data were collected and correlated to the presence of environmental contamination. Results were compared to historical data from a previous study in general wards. RESULTS: In total, 200 samples from 20 patient rooms and 75 samples from common areas and the staff pantry were tested. The results showed that 14 rooms had at least 1 site contaminated, with an overall contamination rate of 14% (28 of 200 samples). Environmental contamination was not associated with day of illness, ventilatory mode, aerosol-generating procedures, or viral load. The frequency of environmental contamination was lower in the ICU than in general ward rooms. Eight samples from the common area were positive, though all were negative on cell culture. CONCLUSION: Environmental contamination in the ICU was lower than in the general wards. The use of mechanical ventilation or high-flow nasal oxygen was not associated with greater surface contamination, supporting their use and safety from an infection control perspective. Transmission risk via environmental surfaces in the ICUs is likely to be low. Nonetheless, infection control practices should be strictly reinforced, and transmission risk via droplet or airborne spread remains.

Detection of air and surface contamination by SARS-CoV-2 in hospital rooms of infected patients.

Understanding the particle size distribution in the air and patterns of environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 is essential for infection prevention policies. Here we screen surface and air samples from hospital rooms of COVID-19 patients for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Environmental sampling is conducted in three airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) in the ICU and 27 AIIRs in the general ward. 245 surface samples are collected. 56.7% of rooms have at least one environmental surface contaminated. High touch surface contamination is shown in ten (66.7%) out of 15 patients in the first week of illness, and three (20%) beyond the first week of illness (p = 0.01, χ2 test). Air sampling is performed in three of the 27 AIIRs in the general ward, and detects SARS-CoV-2 PCR-positive particles of sizes >4 µm and 1-4 µm in two rooms, despite these rooms having 12 air changes per hour. This warrants further study of the airborne transmission potential of SARS-CoV-2.

Detection of Air and Surface Contamination by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in Hospital Rooms of Infected Patients (preprint)

Understanding the particle size distribution in the air and patterns of environmental contamination of SARS-CoV-2 is essential for infection prevention policies. We aimed to detect SARS-CoV-2 surface and air contamination and study associated patient-level factors. 245 surface samples were collected from 30 airborne infection isolation rooms of COVID-19 patients, and air sampling was conducted in 3 rooms. Air sampling detected SARS-CoV-2 PCR-positive particles of sizes >4 m and 1-4 m in two rooms, which warrants further study of the airborne transmission potential of SARS-CoV-2. 56.7% of rooms had at least one environmental surface contaminated. High touch surface contamination was shown in ten (66.7%) out of 15 patients in the first week of illness, and three (20%) beyond the first week of illness (p = 0.01).